Тезисы докладов
B. Wennerholm

B. Wennerholm
Sweden
The battle of Poltava after 300 years – is there more to learn about the battle?

The outcome of the Battle of Poltava made it a truly decisive point in the history of Russia and Sweden. It finally broke the Swedish ambitions of being a great power in European politics and it enabled the Russian modernization process to continue and made possible the emergence of Russia into its future role in Europe. The battle therefore will always catch an interest in later generations.

When studying the battle we are in the hands of available sources and our abilities to interpret them. As with all conflicts there are, at least, two sides to consider, which have their sets of sources and their inclinations when interpreting them. In the case of the Poltava battle the sources on the Russian and Swedish sides are of a very different character. In Russia a wealth of documentation is at hand in the form of correspondence between persons in high places on matters concerning the battle and the events surrounding it, there are the official relations and material from staff work in the Russian army. On the Swedish side practically all official documentation was deliberately destroyed preceding the surrender at Perevolochna and the preserved sources are mainly of a more personal character in the form of diaries and memoirs by those taking part.

These sources have been used in forming the history of the battle on each side. There has been an inclination to use domestic material, with occasional outbreaks of interest in the sources from the other side, some of which have even been translated and published. Unfortunately there is a language barrier; on both sides few scholars have a good command of the other side’s language.

Today I should like to comment on the numerical material from the battle in the form information of strengths of the troops involved, casualties and prisoners taken. On the Russian side the strength of units at Poltava can be reasonably well be established even if there are lacunae. On the Swedish side we have to make approximations based on the information on troop strengths from the turn of the years 1707–1708, which are known with good accuracy, and the scarce and sometimes rather uncertain information on subsequent casualties during 1708 and 1709. The Russian data on prisoners taken has not been taken into account to the extent that they should have been by Swedish scholars. Information on the Swedish prisoners of war in Russia has in Sweden been mainly appreciated from a humane perspective concentrating on the privations of captivity but not for the numerical involved. However the information on the amount of prisoners helps us to calculate the battle casualties at Poltava when compared to the approximations of troop strengths at the time of the battle.

I have tried to assemble data on troop strengths and casualties at Poltava and previous battles in order to try to establish the combat effectiveness of the opponents. Even if the result must be viewed with many reservations the Swedish army’s renowned effectiveness in battle is confirmed as is the successive increase of the combat effectiveness of the Russian army during the war years. However at Poltava both armies displayed a combat effectiveness of 0.20–0.25. This indicates a substantial increase for the Russian forces from Narva in 1700 but was below the usual performance of the Swedish army. It made the outcome obvious in view of the Russian numerical superiority. It also indicates that the fighting performance of the Swedish troops was less than at other battles that it lost as Lesnaya in 1708 and Storkyro/Napue in 1714.

It appears from rather scarce published material that about 25 % of the prisoners taken in 1709 returned to Sweden about 1722 after the peace of Nystad. This indicates a yearly mortality of approximately 11% during the years in captivity, which is considerably less than the corresponding value on campaigning. This type of reasoning might appear cynical, but we have to keep in mind that the combat casualties were a comparatively minor part of the overall losses sustained by military units of the early 18th century, the main reasons being sicknesses of various kinds.

To look at battles from a statistical viewpoint may seem one-sided, but helps us to understand some of the mechanisms behind the outcomes. It has limitations due to the uncertainties in the data involved and has to be combined with information from other sources. One such source that has recently been used is battlefield archaeology.

In the case of the Poltava battle it appears that there are still sources that have not been used to their full potential and particularly have not been scrutinized by both sides in order to construct a common view of the battle. I am sure that future research will still be fruitful and will bring forward aspects of the battle that have so far not been observed.