Тезисы докладов
B. Nilsson

B. Nilsson
Linkoeping University
Satisfaction: the war aims of Sweden 1707–1708

In late 1699 and early 1700 Denmark, Saxony and Russia concluded the final agreements in preparation of the attack on Sweden and Holstein. The parties promised each other to pursue the war until Sweden was prepared to give them “satisfaction”. It was emphasized that this only meant the return of provinces lost in earlier wars. Sweden would basically be pushed back to its early 17th century borders, but no further.

According to Voltaire the war aims of Charles XII were vastly different. The King was, he claimed, the first to have had the ambition to conquer without expanding his own country. Charles only wanted to gain empires so that he could give them away. Is this really true?

In early March 1702 the old Chancery President Bengt Oxenstierna (1623–1702) sent the King a long (and later very famous) memorandum on the war. Oxenstierna strongly urged Charles XII to stay out of Poland and abandon the idea of dethroning Augustus II. Instead Charles should emphasize to the Republic that Augustus threatened Polish liberties, that Sweden and Poland had a common interest in seeing Russia weakened and that the moment had come to recapture the provinces lost through the Truce of Andrusovo in 1667 and the Eternal Peace Treaty of 1686. Oxenstierna thought this line of argument would find support in the Commonwealth. The Sapieha family was already on its way into the Swedish fold and others were believed ready to join them. The Chancery President suggested that Sweden might even be able to acquire both Courland and Polish Livonia if the King followed his advice.

In the autumn of 1705, after the coronation of King Stanisław I Leszczyński, the Swedish-Polish peace discussions intensified. If the Polish negotiators brought up the subject of Courland, the Swedes were instructed to state that Charles XII had every right to keep the Duchy. Since it had never been part of the Commonwealth, the King’s promise to abstain from making conquests at the expense of the Republic was not relevant. On September 14th Arvid Horn presented Charles’s counter offer – the King was prepared to hand over the old Commonwealth provinces in the east after a successful campaign against Russia. The Polish negotiators were not impressed, suggesting that the Swedes would perhaps first need assistance in driving the Russians from Ingria and Livonia. The Swedes replied that the minor parts of the Swedish empire held by the Russians and the huge areas lost to the same Russians by the Commonwealth indicated the differences in military strength between the two countries. Consequently the Poles would be well advised to accept the generous offer.

The Courland discussions continued, but finally Charles XII instructed his negotiators to drop the subject but make sure the peace agreement left the issue open. The intention was obviously to return to the topic after a successful campaign against Russia. The determination to keep the Duchy was clear (Koskull W. v. Hertigdömet Kurlands rättsväsen under den svenska ockupationen 1701–1709 // Historisk tidskrift för Finland. 1951. P. 68, 71; Hassinger E. Brandenburg-Preussen, Schweden und Russland 1700–1713. München, 1953. P. 219).

In the autumn of 1707 the Swedish army began moving eastwards. The Swedish Field Chancery started preparing for a future peace negotiation (Bark S. Bref från Samuel Bark till Olof Hermelin. 2, 1705–1708. Stockholm, 1915. P. 214; Hermelin O. Bref från Olof Hermelin till Samuel Barck. Stockholm, 1913. P. 136). Material on Swedish-Russian relations was requested from Stockholm and both the College of the Chancery (Kanslikollegium) and the College of Commerce (Kommerskollegium) discussed the issue. Two main areas of interest emerged. The first was “satisfaction”, the second commerce (for the commercial issues, see Hildebrand K.G. Ekonomiska syften i svensk expansionspolitik 1700–1709 // Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok. 1949. P. 8–40). The College of the Chancery did not want to present a definite proposal as they believed it was up to the King to decide, but Samuel Barck suggested to his friend Olof Hermelin that Pskov, “det Somerske gebitet” (Сумерская волость), Novgorod and the land up to Arkhangelsk would be an interesting “speculation”. Perhaps the latter was a bit harsh, but there would be no harm in asking (Bark. P. 214; Bref från Urban Hiärne till Olof Hermelin // Historisk tidskrift. 1882. P. 264–265).

Barck’s suggestion may seem unrealistic to a modern eye, but was in reality in line with the memorandum presented by Bengt Oxenstierna in 1702. The Chancery President had not advised Charles XII to make peace with King Augustus because he believed Russia was a more dangerous enemy than Saxony. No, his advice was based on the firm conviction that the Czar would be a far easier opponent. An attack on Saxony, the most efficient method of forcing Augustus to sue for peace, would cause great alarm in the Empire and lead to interventions by other countries. A successful campaign against the Czar would trouble no one, which meant that Sweden could make considerable conquests in the east without risking foreign involvement. Similar views had earlier been expressed by other prominent Swedish officials such as Johan Paulin Olivecrantz and Nils Gyldenstolpe.

What did Charles XII believe? It has often been suggested that he underestimated the Russians and consequently probably held views similar to those expressed by these officials. However, evidence to the contrary exists. At the beginning of 1707 the French envoy Bonac forwarded a letter to Paris which claimed to give an account of conversations between Olof Hermelin and J. C. Stiernhöök, secretary at the Swedish embassy in Vienna. Hermelin had allegedly told his colleague that the King thought the Czar had become a formidable enemy and that extraordinary measures were needed in order to defeat him. Other sources seem to suggest that many in the Swedish army believed that the preparations for the Russian campaign were unnecessarily extensive and that a considerable force could be left in Central Europe to protect Swedish interests. It is impossible to determine if these sources paint an accurate picture, but the size of the King’s preparations were indeed without precedent.